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INTRODUCTION
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)1 is
currently one of the most lucrative investment and trade regions
in the world. ASEAN is the United States' fifth largest trading
partner, with trade totalling $46 billion in 1990.2 U.S. direct in-
vestment in ASEAN amounted to approximately $14 billion in
1990.? Exports from the United States to ASEAN increased by
1. ASEAN was created in August of 1967 with the signing of the Bangkok Declara-
tion by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. See 1 ACADEMY
OF ASEAN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, ASEAN REGIONAL LAW SERIES: VITAL
ASEAN DOCUMENTS 1967-1984, at 25 (1985). In February 1976, at the first ASEAN
summit, the member states signed a "Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South-east
Asia" which obligated each state to further "perpetual peace, everlasting amity and co-
operation." Id. at 143. Brunei Darussalam became a member of ASEAN in January, of
1984. Id. at 50.
2. Peter Bohan, Bush Visit to Singapore to Have ASEAN Flavour, REUTERS, Dec.
29, 1991.
3. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region is as follows:
TABLE 1
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)
Indonesia Mlai)da Philippines Singapore Thailand
(through 1990) (through 1990) (through 1990) (through 1989) (through 1990)
Total FDI 36,066 21,614 3,303 10,600 2,773
US. FDI 2151 1,291 1,771 7,600 339
Japan FD1 8,734 5,187 502 n/a 1,148
US. share or FDI 6.0% 6.0% 53.6% 70.0% 12.2%
Japan share of FDI 24.2% 24.0% 15.2% n/a 41.4%
See Commercial Sectidn of the American Embassy in Jakarta, INDONESIA-COUNTRY
MARKETING PLAN (Sept. 1991), § I(D), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI
File [hereinafter INDONESIA-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN]; Commercial Section of the
American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN (Sept.
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14%, from $19 billion to $21.6 billion in 1991.4 Nevertheless, there
is a sentiment in the region that the United States is neglecting
Southeast Asia as it .concerns itself with solving problems else-
where.5 The criticism derives largely from the fact that Japan is
now the largest investor in ASEAN." U.S. investors simply appear
to be shying away from the investment opportunities in ASEAN,
despite the potential financial gains.7
Ostensibly, the cornerstone of the United States' efforts to
promote and protect American investment in Lesser Developed
Countries (LDCs) is the United States Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program. The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) establishes legally
binding standards of treatment that each signatory must afford to
the other signatory's investors and investments. Breach of these
standards by one signatory gives rise to a legal cause of action by
the other signatory. If properly constructed and coordinated with
1991), § I(D), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File [hereinafter MALAY-
SIA-CoUNTRY MARKETING PLAN]; Commercial Section of the American Embassy in
Manila, PHIUPPINES-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN (Sept. 1991), § I(D), available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File [hereinafter PHILIPPINES--COUNTRY MARKETING
PLAN]; Commercial Section of the American Embassy in Singapore, SINGA-
PORE-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN (Sept. 1991), § I(D), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, ALLASI File [hereinafter SINGAPORE-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN]; Commer-
cial Section of the American Embassy in Bangkok, THAILAND-CoUNTRY MARKETING
PLAN (Oct. 1991), § I(D), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File [hereinaf-
ter THAILAND-CoUNTRY MARKETING PLAN].
4. See Bohan, supra note 2.
5. Sit R. Dollah, Bush Visit to Singapore Signals New Relations with Asia, KYODO
NEWS SERV., Dec. 25, 1991. In an effort to respond to this deficiency, the Bush Admin-
istration created a joint commercial commission with Thailand in 1990 and signed Trade
and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with Singapore and the Philippines.
Minerva A. Lau, U.S., Singapore Sign Trade Pact, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Oct. 19, 1991, at 24.
The TIFAs established a council of senior-level trade officials from both countries, which
meets to discuss "bilateral trade issues such as anti-dumping regulations, market access,
services and intellectual property rights." Id. The United States has signed TIFAs with 29
other states, mostly Latin American and Caribbean states, since the stalling of the Uru-
guay Round talks. See Reuters Business Report, U.S. Trade Representative in Singapore
for Trade Pact, REUTERlS, Oct. 10, 1991.
6. See supra note 3; see also Siti R. Dollah, Bush Hears Fear of Japan Domination,
KYODO NEWS SERV., Jan. 5, 1992. In fact, Japan has been the world's top investor since
1990. See id.
7. See Table 1, supra note 3. In general, developing countries present an exception-
ally lucrative investment climate for U.S. investors. The average annual rate of return in
developing countries has been approximately 17% while in developed countries it has
been only 11.7%. IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE
AGENCY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 24 n.13 (1988) (citing U.S. Dep't of Commerce
figures for period 1980-1985).
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other legal instruments, the BIT can be effective in creating a
positive investment climate in LDCs by reducing non-economic
risk.' However, instead of utilizing the BIT to reduce non-eco-
nomic risk and to coordinate other legal instruments, the United
States has utilized the BIT primarily to fortify its position on
various international legal principles." Accordingly, the United
States has attempted to sign the same BIT with as few modifica-
tions as possible."° This philosophy has led the United States to
refuse to compromise regarding its BIT requirement that the part-
ner state treat U.S. investors and their investments equal to local
investors and their investments." This inflexibility has been the
main reason why ASEAN states have rejected the United States
BIT.2 In order to obtain acceptance of the BIT in ASEAN, the
United States should make the primary goals of the BIT Program
the reduction of non-economic risk and the coordination of other
legal instruments. Additionally, the United States should take
advantage of the flexibility inherent in the BIT by adjusting the
Model BIT 3 according to the level of economic, political, and
8. The term "non-economic risk" refers to risk caused by the political and social
environment of the host state: a corrupt bureaucracy, poor intellectual property protec-
tion, political instability, etc.
9. See infra Part I1.
10. Note the relatively small variance among the provisions contained in the United
States' BITs with Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Grenada, Haiti, Morocco, Panama, Sene-
gal, Turkey, and Zaire. See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protec-
tion of Investments, [hereinafter TCREPI] Mar. 12, 1986, U.S.-Bangl., S. TREATY Doe.
No. 23, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, Feb. 26, 1985, U.S.-Cameroon, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 22, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, S.
TREATY Doe. No. 24, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, May 2, 1986, U.S.-Gren., S.
TREATY Doe. No. 25, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, Dec. 11, 1983, U.S.-Haiti, S.
TREATY Doe. No. 16, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, July 22, 1985, U.S.-Morocco,
S. TREATY Doe- No. 18, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, Oct. 27, 1982, U.S.-Pan.,
S. TREATY Doe. No. 14, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, Dec. 6, 1983, U.S.-Sen.,
S. TREATY Doe. No. 15, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, Dec. 3, 1985, U.S.-Turk.,
S. TREATY Doe. No. 19, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); TCREPI, Aug. 3, 1984, U.S-Zaire,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
11. This requirement is called "national treatment." For a discussion on the problems
with the national treatment standard in the United States Model BIT, see infra notes
92-104 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part III.
13. The U.S. BITs are all based on a model treaty that was created in 1982 and
revised in 1983 and 1984. See Treaty Between the United States of America and [_1
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Feb. 24, 1984
[hereinafter U.S. Model BIT], reprinted in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 655 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter BA-
SIC DOCUMENTS]. The latest draft was revised based upon the experiences of earlier BIT
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social stability of each potential partner, instead of treating all
LDCs alike.
Part I of this Note examines the extent, purposes, and value
of BITs in general. Part II analyzes the purposes and intentions of
the current United States BIT Program. Then, Part III compares
the major provisions of the United States Model BIT to parallel
provisions contained in BITs signed between ASEAN and Europe-
an states in an effort to discern what treaty provisions are appro-
priate for the United States BIT. This Note concludes that the
United States must reform its approach to the BIT Program soon,
or the opportunity will be lost for the BIT to operate to its full
potential in ASEAN.
I. THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
The BIT has become the bilateral agreement of choice for
codifying investment agreements between countries in the world
today. As of March 1991, 302 BITs had been signed, 4 mostly
between developed and developing countries. 5 Section A exam-
ines why bilateral agreements in general are attractive mechanisms
for establishing standards for foreign direct investment. Section B
discusses the purposes and strengths of the BIT in particular.
A. The Advantages of Bilateral Agreements
Bilateral agreements are particularly appropriate for settling
international investment issues between developed states and
LDCs, primarily because they provide flexibility for both partners.
negotiations. A comparison of the drafts is useful to see how policy has altered only
slightly from the inception of the BIT Program. See Treaty Between the United States
and [_] Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
1982 (on file with the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office
of the President, Washington, D.C. 20506); Treaty Between the United States and
[_.] Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Jan. 21,
1983 [hereinafter 1983 Model BIT, reprinted in Appendix to Kathleen Kunzer, Develop-
ing a Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 273 (1983).
14. See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETITLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, IN-
VESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter ICSID].
15. See id. As of mid-1987, "[olver 70 developing countries have signed-though not
necessarily ratified--one or more treaties .... " UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANS-
NATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 7 (1988) [hereinafter
UNCTNC]. The majority of these 70 developing countries are in Africa and Southeast
Asia. See id. Twelve BITs have been signed between developing countries. See id.;
ICSID, supra note 14. ,
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Bilateral treaties enable partners to make concessions without
compromising their positions on unsettled customary international
legal principles. Although treaties in general are said to affect
customary international law,16 it is generally accepted that most
bilateral treaties have very little influence on international custom-
ary law, due both to their lack of opinion juris and to their indi-
vidual natures." Therefore, a signatory to a bilateral treaty can
agree to terms contrary to positions it has taken regarding custom-
ary international law and still not concede that position as to
customary international law if it states that the treaty is merely a
contractual arrangement with the other signatory and not a repre-
sentation of international legal obligation. This factor is especially
important for an LDC because the fact that the international
principle is not yet settled gives it a valuable bargaining tool in
the negotiating process. The LDC may have already resigned itself
to the inclusion in a bilateral agreement of a principle espoused
by the capital-exporting state but it can still hold out the principle
as something which needs to be "purchased" with some concession
by the capital-exporting state."
Although the effect of bilateral agreements on specific cus-
tomary international law is limited, bilateral agreements serve
three positive functions in relation to international commercial
relations. First, bilateral agreements can provide the foundation
upon which a future multilateral agreement may be built. Once
an extensive framework of bilateral agreements has been estab-
lished, a multilateral agreement may be possible in the future.
Multilateral agreements are ultimately more desirable than bilater-
al arrangements because they simplify the international economic
16. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1945); RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. 3D § 102 (1987) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT].
17. See Louis HENKiN ET AT., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 78
(2d ed. 1987) ("Rules found in treaties can never be conclusive evidence of customary
international law."); id. at 70 ("[Treaties are no more a source of law than an ordinary
private law contract that creates rights and obligations .... In itself, the treaty and 'the
law' it contains only applies to the parties to it."); SHIHATA, supra note 7, at 239 (opin-
ion juris is necessary if principles in BITs are to become international law); M.
Sornarajah, State Responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L.
79, 82 (1986) ("Each treaty is nothing but lex specilis between parties designed to create
a mutual regime of investment protection.").
18. Of course, for this strategy to be successful, the capital-exporting state must be
willing to negotiate and compromise on some other issue.
19. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 102 cmt. i (1987).
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system and provide for stronger norms. However, bilateral agree-
ments are preferable as a first step in resolving highly contentious
issues, such as those involved in foreign direct investment, simply
because bilateral treaty negotiations involve only two parties with
conflicting interests." Second, bilateral agreements can strengthen
the international legal and economic order. The signing of each
treaty indicates that treaties are valuable legal documents which
guide and restrict state behavior. Additionally, as more treaties are
signed, more disputes over treaty interpretation will arise. As a
result, international judicial bodies, such as the International Court
of Justice or tribunals formed under the International Convention
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), will be called
upon to resolve these disputes, thereby strengthening the role and
legitimacy of these bodies in international economic affairs. Fur-
thermore, domestic courts will inevitably be called upon to inter-
pret these treaties, again providing legitimacy to international legal
obligations. Third, bilateral treaty negotiations simply can provide
the parties with a forum to sit down and discuss their perspectives
on trade and investment, a function that is crucial to successful
trade and investment relations.
B. Purposes of the Bilateral Investment Treaty
The primary purpose of the BIT should be to reduce non-eco-
nomic risk and thereby open up otherwise neglected investment
opportunities. BITs can reduce non-economic risk primarily by
establishing legally enforceable standards of treatment for foreign
investment. The BIT should not, and cannot, promote and protect
investment without the assistance of other mechanisms. Whether
the BIT can actually "promote" or "encourage" foreign direct
investment standing alone is doubtful:
The existence of a bilateral treaty is only one factor among many
which may affect a potential investor's decision to invest in a
particular developing country .... Other factors taken into con-
sideration by the prospective investors are the political stability
of the host country; the economic, industrial and administrative
20. Investment issues have historically proven to be highly controversial, especially
between developed and developing countries. See ROBERT WILSON, UNITED STATES
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1960) (discussing the difficulties
caused by the inclusion of investment-related clauses in Treaties of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation).
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framework; the economic profitability of an initial investment or
an increase in current investments... ; [and] the incentives
package or the selection of new investment arrangements ....
In practical terms, unless the host country can offer a secure
profit-making venture to the foreign investor, the existence of a
bilateral treaty will not in itself attract investors.2
Therefore, the BIT will be more effective when utilized in con-
junction with 'other mechanisms which also work to reduce non-
economic risk." BITs can provide the anchor for other legal in-
stitutions and agreements, such as taxation treaties,' political risk
insurance,.' Investment Guarantee Agreements (IGAs),' domes-
tic laws of the host and exporting state, investment contracts be-
tween a foreign investor and the host state, and intellectual prop-
erty protection agreements.
21. UNCTNC, supra note 15, at 1-2. Statistics indicate that the flow of investment
does not correspond with the signing of BiTs. Id. at 10-11; see also KLAUS W.
GREWLIcH, TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN A NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 56 (1980)
(arguing that BITs appear to have no effect on investment flow).
22. This Note concentrates on the BIT; therefore, other forms of legal protection and
encouragement of foreign investment are discussed only as they relate to the BIT.
23. Taxation treaties are useful for creating a tax environment that encourages, or at
least does not discourage, investment abroad. See, e.g., THAILAND-COUNTRY MARKET-
ING PLAN, supra note 3, § V(B) ("Benefits . . .would include exemption from Thai cor-
porate income taxes on sales transactions, reduced dividend withholding tax, lower royalty
withholding tax .... [and] removal of capital gains taxes on sale of shares .... "). The
capital-importing states use the tax structure as a way to channel investment into certain
forms of ventures (e.g., equity joint ventures, stock joint ventures, concession agreements,
etc.) or certain sectors or types of investment (e.g., pioneer technology, capital-intense
ventures, labor-intense ventures, or publicly useful ventures like power generation). See
Seiji Naya & Eric D. Ramstetter, Policy Interactions and Direct Foreign Investment in
East and Southeast Asia, 22 J. WoRLD TRADE 57, 65 (No. 2 1988) ("Most governments
[in developing countries achieve industrial targeting] with a variety of policy measures
(e.g., tax policy, subsidies, tariff and quota exemptions, and foreign exchange restriction
exemptions)."); see also SINGAPORE INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INVESTOR'S GUIDE
TO THE ECONOMIC CLIMATE IN SINGAPORE 30 (1991) (stating that Singapore provides
special tax incentives for projects that introduce "technology, know-how or skills into an
industry which is substantially more advanced than that of the average level prevailing in
that industry").
24. For a discussion on the U.S. political risk insurance scheme, see infra notes
27-38 and accompanying text. Although national insurance schemes have been quite
popular among developed states, they have not been adequate. See UNCINC, supra note
15, at 4 ("As of 1986, about 20 countries, 16 of which are members of [OECD], offer
their investors political risk insurance."); SHIHATA, supra note 7, at 18 (arguing that
national insurance schemes cover a small percentage of investments). As a result, the
World Bank decided to establish a multilateral organization to reduce, or hopefully re-
move, political risk barriers to investment in developing countries. See id. at 17-18.
25. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
26. Intellectual and industrial property protection is vital to creating an attractive in-
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The most important of these legal instruments is non-econom-
ic risk insurance. Foreign investors conduct a risk-return analysis,
and if the risk outweighs the potential return, they will not make
an investmentY Part of the determination of whether the risk is
acceptable or not is the possibility of obtaining insurance against
such a risk.
The alleviation of non-commercial investment risks through guar-
antees is of particular benefit to the developing world. It facili-
tates investments that may not have otherwise been made with-
out the coverage .... The purpose of such guarantees is not to
make an inherently bad project good. Rather, it is to reduce, if
not neutralize, the uncertainty factor by providing protection
against unanticipated risks .... By taking coverage, the investor
is given the confidence to make an investment decision based on
business considerations, instead of foregoing profitable opportuni-
ties due to perceptions of political risk.'
Insurance companies, like investors, also conduct a risk analysis to
determine whether to insure a particular investment, and if so,
what to charge-the lower the risk, the higher the chance of ob-
taining insurance and the lower the cost of that insurance. "Unless
the insurer is satisfied that the legal protection of an investment is
sufficiently guaranteed under the domestic law of the host State or
in some other way, the existence of a treaty may be the condition
sine qua non for political risk insurance.""
U.S. investors often look to the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) ° for insurance against non-economic risk
encountered when investing in LDCs. OPIC provides insurance
vestment environment in developing countries because many developing countries are
interested in attracting pioneer technologies, but often lack effective legal protection for
intellectual and industrial property. See, e.g., Commercial Section of the American Em-
bassy in Kuala Lumpur, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United
States: Malaysia (June 11, 1991), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File.
27. See SHIHATA, supra note 7, at 15. Of course the acceptable risk-to-return ratio
depends upon whether the investor is risk-averse, -neutral, or -preferring. See id. Even if
the investor chooses to brave the risks, he will most likely utilize various risk manage-
ment techniques to limit the loss (e.g., minimal or no reinvestment of profits or restricted
use and access of high-tech know-how). See id. at 18 (arguing that such techniques often
elicit adverse reactions from host states, leading to a heightened danger of political loss).
28. ld. at 19.
29. UNCTNC, supra note 15, at 4.
30. OPIC is a U.S. government-owned corporation, backed by the "full faith and
credit" of the United States. OPIC's authorization is codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a
(1988).
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and reinsurance against losses due to currency inconvertibility;
expropriation; war, revolution, insurrection, and civil strife; and
business interruption resulting therefrom."- Insurance is generally
not obtainable by U.S. investors unless there is some form of
bilateral agreement between the United States and the host
state.' Historically, this requirement of the existence of a bilateral
agreement has been filled by Investment Guaranty Agreements
(IGAs),33 normally created by an exchange of letters between the
executive and the host state.' IGAs subrogate the insurer's rights
to the investors' rights whenever the insurers pay out compensa-
tion to the insured investors?5 However, IGAs themselves do not
create substantive legal rights.' BITs, like the Treaties of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCNs) that preceded them, pro-
vide substantive legal rights which can be enforced in a domestic
or international judicial forumY The United States Model BIT
31. Id. § 2194(a)(1).
32. See id. § 2197(a) (requiring a bilateral agreement for all-risk financial guarantees
of loans and other investments issued pursuant to § 2194(b) and political risk insurance
and reinsurance issued pursuant to § 2194(a)). "As a matter of policy, OPIC generally
does not offer any of its programs in countries with which there is no active bilateral
agreement." ROBERT C. O'SULLIVAN, INTRODUCTION TO REGULATION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT MODEL OPIC INvESTMENT INCENTIVE AGREEMENT, reprinted in 1 BASIC
DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 665. In fact, in many states "[t]he existence of a bilateral
investment treaty is often the condition for national insurance against political investment
risks . . . ." UNCTNC, supra note 15, at IX.
33. IGAs created between the United States and its trading partners have traditional-
ly been referred to as "Agreements on Investment Guaranties." See O'SULLIVAN, supra
note 32, at 665.
34. See id. The U.S. has signed IGAs with all ASEAN members except Brunei. See
UNCINC, supra note 15, at 4-5. The U.S. has concluded 116 IGAs as of 1986 and ap-
pears to be committed to continuing the trend. See id at 6. Some other countries often
will place a subrogation clause into the BIT and thereby conflate the IGA and BIT into
one document. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Singapore
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, July 22, 1975, art. 10, 1975 U.K.T.S.
No. 151 (Ctrnd. 6300).
35. See Model OPIC Investment Incentive Agreement, United States - _ _], art.
3 [hereinafter U.S. Model IGA], reprinted in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at
669.
36. See generally U.S. Model IGA, supra note 35; see also Robert O'Sullivan, Regula-
tion of Foreign Investment: Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and Sample Provision
from Negotiated BITs, 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 649.
37. See O'Sullivan, supra note 36, at 649; Joseph Norton, The Renegotiability of Unit-
ed States Bilateral Commercial Treaties with the Member States of the European Economic
Community, 8 TEX. INT'L I.J. 299, 311 (1973) (stating that many of the obligations creat-
ed by FCNs are legally enforceable in domestic courts).
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provides specific rights to each contracting party in relation to all
of the losses insurable with OPIC.' Furthermore, the United
States Model BIT attempts to assist U.S. IGAs by requiring that
"[e]ach Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and
enforcing rights with respect to investment agreements . .. .""
This clause is designed to require each contracting state to recog-
nize IGAs as legally binding under its domestic laws, thereby pro-
viding legal redress in the host state. Thus BITs can provide sub-
stance to IGAs and to the insurance schemes which rely on
IGAs.
Another source of rights and obligations which the insurers
can claim by subrogation are contracts between the investors and
the host state, or perhaps between the investors and a local corpo-
ration. However, these contracts, especially those with a local
business entity, are less reliable because they are concluded on an
ad hoc basis and vary depending upon the relative strengths of the
bargaining parties. These contracts may give rise to a multitude of
legal issues and therefore may only result in lengthy and fruitless
litigation. Or, if they contain no provisions for arbitration, these
contracts may be completely worthless. In any event, the United
States Model BIT provides that any obligation existing between
the investor and the host state shall not be hindered by provisions
in the BIT if there are provisions more favorable contained in the
investment contract.' As a result, OPIC may assert the rights of
the investor established in the investment contract with the host
state as well as the rights established in the BIT.
Therefore, direct protection from non-economic risk (risk
reduction) and coordination of other instruments that reduce risk
should be considered the main purposes of the BIT; investment
promotion is only the byproduct of these goals.
II. THE PRESENT UNITED STATES BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY PROGRAM
When the United States embarked on its BIT Program in the
early 1980s, legal scholars predicted that the Model BIT would be
38. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. III, § 1 (expropriation); art. III, § 3
(losses due to war, insurrection, civil strife, revolution); art. IV (free transfer of assets in
convertible currency).
39. Id, art. II, § 6.
40. Id, art. II, § 1.
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unsuccessful in protecting and promoting U.S. direct investment in
LDCs."' This prediction was essentially correct: The United States
has signed only ten BITs,. 2 none of which are with ASEAN
states. The United States has signed FCNs with Brunei and Thai-
land.'3 The FCNs contain clauses that form the basis for sections
of the United States Model BIT;" but as they were not designed
specifically to deal with questions of international investment, they
are of only marginal value for the U.S. foreign direct investor. '
The only other materially relevant agreements between the United
States and ASEAN states are the IGAs with Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Singapore' and the TIFAs with the Philip-
pines and Singapore.47
The United States BIT Program is directed mainly at develop-
ing countries." All ten of the treaties signed by the United States
41. See, eg., Patricia M. Robin, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 931, 934 (1984).
42. The United States has signed BITs with Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Grenada,
Haiti, Morocco, Panama, Senegal, Turkey, and Zaire. See supra note 10.
43. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, May 29, 1966, U.S.-Thai., 19 U.S.T.
5843; Treaty of Peace Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, June 23, 1850, U.S.-Brunei,
10 Stat. 909. Note that "FCN" is the term used to describe this whole class of commer-
cial treaties, even though some of them are actually entitled "Treaty of Amity and Eco-
nomic Relations." See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of
the United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 203 n.19 (1988).
44. See Vandevelde, supra note 43, at 207-10.
45. See Robin, supra note 41, at 940-41 (commenting that "these treaties fail to meet
American investors' needs"). See generally K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Standards,
4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 105, 107-09 (1986); Wayne Sachs, The "New" U.S. Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 192, 195-98 (1984).
46. Agreement Relating to Investment Guaranties, Jan. 7, 1967, U.S.-Indon., 18
U.S.T. 1850 (entered into force August 22, 1967 and still in force as of April 1992);
Agreement Relating to Investment Guaranties, Mar. 25, 1966, U.S.-Sing., 17 U.S.T. 534
(entered into force March 25, 1966 and still in force as of April 1992); Agreement Re-
lating to the Guaranties Authorized Under Section 413(b)(4) of the Mutual Security Act
of 1954, Apr. 21, 1959, U.S.-Malay., 10 U.S.T. 776 (entered into force April 21, 1959 and
still in force as of April 1992) (amended June 24, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 1086); Agreement Re-
lating to the Guaranties Authorized by Section 111(b)(3) of the Economic Cooperation
Act of 1948, Feb. 18-19, 1952, U.S.-Phil., 3 U.S.T. 3878 (entered into force February 19,
1952 and still in force as of April 1992) (amended Feb. 25, 1965 and Aug. 15, 1966, 17
U.S.T. 1557).
47. See supra note 5.
48. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release No. 82101, Jan. 13,
1982, at 2 ("With the increased importance of the developing countries in the world
economy, we need new bilateral treaties in the investment.area."); Robin, supra note 41,
at 933 n.13 ("Investment relations among industrialized countries are sufficiently stable to
allow market forces to allocate investment resources, thereby obviating the need for trea-
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under the BIT Program have been with developing countries.49
According to the executive branch, the purpose of the BIT Pro-
gram, and of United States trade and investment policy in general,
is to reduce barriers to American investment abroad, to increase
U.S. investment in LDCs so that they may develop more quickly,
and to keep the United States open to foreign investment.- Yet
although the State Department and the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) state otherwise, it appears that the BIT Program is not in
fact aimed at "forc[ing] open the door for investment" in LDCs.5
Instead, it seems that the BIT Program was designed with two
other goals in mind: to protect existing investments'2 and to forti-
fy the United States' position on various unsettled principles of
customary international law. 3 The United States argues that if the
same, or substantially similar, provisions are agreed to in bilateral
agreements again and again, they will take on the character of
"customary state practice" and carry more weight in the dispute
over customary legal norms.' Therefore, the United States be-
ty guaranties."); Sachs, supra note 45, at 194, 198 n.48; Vandevelde, supra note 43, at
209.
49. See supra note 42.
50. See U.S. Policy Toward International Investment: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on International Economic Policy of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 180, 184 (1981) (statement of Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Ass't U.S. Trade Representa-
tive for Investment Policy, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative); Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, Press Release No. 82116, Sept. 29, 1982; Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Press Release No. 82119, Oct. 27, 1982; Gist: International Investment,
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, July 29, 1991, at 552; see also Sachs, supra note 45, at 194 (1984).
For a-discourse on the guiding principles of U.S. trade and investment policy in general,
see. Statement on International Investment Policy, 1983 PUB. PAPERS 1243 (Sept. 12,
1983). As of July 1991 "U.S. policy continues to be guided by [this statement]." DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH, July 29, 1991, at 552.
51. Eric V. Youngquist, United States Commercial Treaties: Their Role in Foreign
Economic Policy, 2 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 72, 84 (1967) (quoting an unclassified memoran-
dum from Sester, Commercial Treaties Division, Dep't of State, to Blankenheimer, Dep't
of Commerce (Mar. 29, 1961)).
52. See id.
53. See UNCrNC, supra note 15, at 7 (stating that "negotiation of [BITs] developed
into a deliberate policy ... to counteract what some capital-exporting countries consid-
ered 'a continuous erosion of principles of customary international law through United
Nations resolutions, such as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.");
Gudgeon, supra note 45, at 111 (stating that "BITs were proposed as a means of
strengthening principles of customary international law and practice as observed and
advocated by the United States and its developed-country partners in the [OECD]");
Sachs, supra note 45, at 195 (noting that "[ain important function of the BIT program is
to lend weight . . . to the United States' position on various points of international law
and practice").
54. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 20, at 17 (arguing that "[a] single state that secures
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lieves that any compromise on its position on unsettled customary
international principles in a bilateral agreement will be detrimental
to its position on the appropriate customary international law.'
The attempt to utilize BITs to fortify the United States' posi-
tion on customary international law should be abandoned for sev-
eral reasons. First, this use of BITs is counterproductive because it
eliminates the flexibility that makes the bilateral agreement so ad-
vantageous in this area of international relations. The ability to
negotiate and compromise over sensitive and contentious issues is
essential to completing successful international agreements. Second,
this use of the BITs is inconsistent with the United States' position
on compensation for expropriated property. The United States
maintains that compensation for property expropriated from a
foreign investor must be for the full value of the property, where-
as most foreign investors actually accept less than full compensa-
tion for expropriated property.' Applying the logic inherent in
the United States' position on the effect of BITs, the fact that
most states actually provide less than full value for expropriated
property should mean that the actual "customary practice" of
states is to provide less than full compensation to foreign inves-
tors-contrary to the United States' position in the BIT Program.
Third and more important, the objective of fortifying the
United States position on customary international law is not an
appropriate basis for concluding treaties with states with the level
of development of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, or Thai-
land.' Due to the underlying goals of the present United States
BIT Program, the United States Model BIT has not been suffi-
ciently altered to fit the needs of ASEAN. As treaty negotiations
with Singapore in the 1970s, and with Indonesia and Malaysia in
the 1980s have shown, the ASEAN states are sophisticated and
independent enough to resist a U.S. dictation of terms, but have
not reached a level of economic security that would allow them to
adopt more open investment policies.' But these states are pre-
acceptance by many other states of viable clauses in bilateral agreements may well influ-
ence progress toward a generally applied rule").
55. See supra note 53.
56. For a discussion on the United States' position on compensation for expropriated
property, see infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
57. Singapore and Brunei are not listed here because it appears that they have
achieved a level of economic, political, and social stability high enough to make a BIT of
little value. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
58. Indonesia and Malaysia both declined to sign the U.S. BIT mainly because of
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cisely at a stage of economic, political, and social development in
which treaty protection is most useful. 9 Treaty protection for
non-economic risk is most appropriate for nations that have at-
tained a relatively high degree of economic prosperity and stability
but still lag in political and social stability. Concluding a treaty to
protect U.S. investors from non-economic risk with a state that is
already politically and socially stable is of marginal value, because
there is little or no non-economic risk that needs to be guarded
against. Singapore provides an excellent example of a situation in
which the ideal time to conclude a BIT has already passed. In
January 1992, the State Department announced that the United
States will sign a BIT with Singapore sometime in the near fu-
ture.' However, Singapore has already reached an extremely high
degree of economic, political, and social stability; the ideal time to
sign a BIT with Singapore would have been in the late 1970s or
objections to the'national treatment requirements. See Commercial Section of the Ameri-
can Embassy in Jakarta, INDONESIA-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN FY '91 (Mar. 1991) §
V(9)(B)(c), available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File [hereinafter INDONE-
SIA-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN FY '911; Commercial Section of the American Embas-
sy in Kuala Lumpur, MALAYSIA-COUNTRY REPORT (Mar. 1991), available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, ALLASI [hereinafter MALAYSIA-COUNTRY REPORT]. For a discussion
of why Singapore refused to sign the U.S. BIT, see Mark S. Bergman, Bilateral Invest-
ment Protection Treaties: An Examination of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S.
Prototype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL 1, 10 n.47 (1983); see also Naya &
Ramstetter, supra note 23, at 65.
59. The International Country Risk Guide, published by International Business Com-
munications, Ltd., London, annually ranks the relative risks (political, financial, and eco-
nomic) of countries. The maximum score (least risky) is 100 for political risk and 50 for
financial and economic risk. The following chart is taken from the 1991 International
Country Risk Guide. Non-ASEAN states are included as points of reference.
Political Financial Economic
Brunei 81.0 48.0 41.5
Singapore 79.0 48.0 39.5
U.S. 78.0 49.0 39.5
Malaysia 71.0 45.0 38.5
Indonesia 57.0 44.0 35.5
Thailand 57.0 42.0 37.0
Egypt 54.0 30.0 29.0
Panama 47.0 28.0 34.0
Philippines 41.0 22.0 29.5
Monua Janah, Rating Risk in the Hot Countries: How Two Firms Gauge Investment Safe-
ty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1991, at R4. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand received high
scores for financial and economic risk, but moderately low scores for political risk. The
Philippines was ranked substantially lower in all three categories. Brunei and Singapore
were rated politically less risky than the United States.
60. See Senator Urges Bush to Seek Solid Trade Action from Japan, KYODO NEWS
SERV., Jan. 4, 1992, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLASI File.
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early 1980s.61 Similarly, concluding a treaty with a state that has
such a low level of economic development that foreign investment
will not be profitable is also of marginal value, because the reduc-
tion of non-economic risk is worthless in a situation in which there
is little potential for economic gain.'
The United States should change its approach to treaty nego-
tiations: Instead of treating all LDCs alike, the United States
should negotiate its treaties according to the level of economic,
political, and social stability of each potential partner. It should
not treat as similar a state with a low level of economic, political,
and social stability, like Haiti, and a state with moderate econom-
ic, political, and social stability, like Malaysia.
III. THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY AND ASEAN
Of all of the ASEAN states, only Brunei has not signed a
BIT.' However, the United States has not concluded any BITs
61. The International Country Risk Guide rated Singapore above the United States
in the political risk category. See supra note 59; see also SINGAPORE-COuNTRY MAR-
KETING PLAN, supra note 3, § III(A) ("Singapore is a parliamentary democracy that
prides itself on political stability and the predictability this offers to foreign investors and
traders."). In fact, some people have advocated that Singapore be invited to join the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. See Peter Hazelhurst, STRArrs
TIMEs,. Nov. 4, 1988, at 4. Brunei, although for entirely different reasons, was also rated
above the United States in the political risk category, see supra note 59, and therefore
the ideal time for conclusion of a BIT may have already passed.
62. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Note that this makes the conclusion of
a treaty with the Philippines arguably somewhat premature due to its high economic risk.
See supra note 59. Also, it should not be assumed that this Note argues against the con-
clusion of investment protection treaties with any state. Treaties with states with stable
economies, political systems, and social institutions are valuable in their own right be-
cause they create more certainty for investors and help to fortify international legal insti-
tutions. See supra Section I(B). Additionally, treaties with states that have very low eco-
nomic development may become extremely valuable if the state eventually develops eco-
nomically such that foreign investment becomes profitable. The position of this Note is
simply that these situations deserve different approaches and that investment promotion
and protection agreements are most useful in situations where-a state is relatively pros-
perous economically but has underdeveloped political or social institutions.
63. There are 21 BITs currently signed between ASEAN states and European states.
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 12, 1985, Aus.-Malay.
[hereinafter Aus.-Malay. BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, Feb. 27, 1985, Neth.-Phil. [hereinafter Neth.-Phil. BIT]; Agreement Concerning the
Mutual Protection of Investments, Nov. 6, 1984, Nor.-Malay. [hereinafter Nor.-Malay.
BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 21, 1981, U.K.-
Malay. [hereinafter U.K.-Malay. BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of In-
vestments, Dec. 3, 1980, U.K.-Phil. [hereinafter U.K.-Phil. BIT]; Agreement Concerning
the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 3, 1979, Swed.-Malay. [hereinafter Swed.-Ma-
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with ASEAN members. Treaty negotiations with Singapore col-
lapsed in 1973 and have only just begun again in 1991 with the
negotiation of the Singapore TIFA.' Three rounds of treaty nego-
tiations with Malaysia ended in failure.' There have been no ne-
gotiations with Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, or Thailand.'
The reason for the United States' failure is quite simple: The
United States Model BIT contains several clauses that are objec-
tionable to most of the ASEAN states, and unfortunately, the
United States has not appeared willing to negotiate and compro-
mise on these provisions.
A comparison of key provisions of the United States Model
BIT with similar provisions from BITs signed between European
states and ASEAN states is useful in determining what clauses in
the United States Model BIT should, and what clauses should not,
be changed. These provisions-pertaining to the scope of applica-
tion, treatment standards, currency transfer, and expropriation-are
the heart of the BIT's legal guarantees and are the most important
to prospective investors. The scope of application and treatment
standards are the most problematic provisions; this Note proposes
lay. BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 28, 1978,
U.K.-Thai. [hereinafter U.K.-Thai BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Nov. 17, 1978, Sing.-Belg.-Lux. [hereinafter Sing.-Belg.-Lux. BIT]; Agreement
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 27, 1976, U.K.-Indon. [hereinafter
U.K.-Indon. BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sept. 8,
1975, Sing.-Fr. [hereinafter Sing.-Fr. BIT]; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, July 22, 1975, U.K.-Sing. [hereinafter U.K.-Sing. BIT]; Agreement Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Oct. 3, 1973, F.R.G.-Sing.
[hereinafter F.R.G.-Sing. BIT]; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Mar. 6, 1973, Sing.-Switz. [hereinafter Sing.-Switz. BIT]; Agreement on Eco-
nomic Cooperation, June 6, 1972, Neth.-Thai. [hereinafter Neth.-Thai. BIT]; Agreement
on Economic Cooperation, May 16, 1972, Neth.-Sing. [hereinafter Neth.-Sing. BIT];
Agreement on Economic Co-operation, June 15, 1971, Neth.-Malay. [hereinafter Neth.-
Malay. BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and the Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Nov. 24, 1969, Indon.-Nor. [hereinafter Indon.-Nor. BIT]; Agreement Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Nov. 8, 1968,
F.R.G.-Indon. [hereinafter F.R.G.-Indon. BIT]; Agreement on Economic Cooperation, July
7, 1968, Neth.-Indon. [hereinafter Neth.-Indon. BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Promo-
tion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mar. 3, 1964, F.R.G.-Phil. [hereinafter
F.R.G.-Phil. BIT]; Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Dec. 22, 1960, F.R.G.-Malay. [hereinafter F.R.G.-Malay. BIT].
64. See Senator Urges Bush to Seek Solid Trade Action from Japan, supra note 60.
65. See MAMAYSIA--COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 58, § V.
66. The State Department has explicitly stated that negotiations with Indonesia were
not begun due to the understanding that there was no possibility of obtaining national
treatment. See INDONESIA-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN, supra note 3, § V(B)(c).
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possible adjustments to these clauses. The currency transfer and
expropriation provisions, although extremely important to inves-
tors, are not as controversial.
A. Scope of Application
The definitional section of the BIT heavily impacts the effec-
tiveness of the treaty. The definitions of "investments," "activities
associated therewith,'' "nationals," and "companies" are the most
important, and the most problematic.
1. Types of Investment Protected. The United States Model
BIT brings under its protection "every kind of investment."'6 In-
cluded specifically in a non-exclusive list are direct and equity
investments, contractual rights, and intellectual and industrial prop-
erty rights.' The United States Model BIT also provides that
"[a]ny alteration of the form in which assets are invested or rein-
vested shall not affect their character as investment." 9 Activities
that are "associated" with investments are also protected."
Comparison with the ASEAN treaties indicates that the U.S.
provisions are basically acceptable to the ASEAN states. The
ASEAN treaties' definition of the term "investment" uses the
phrase "every kind of asset," followed by a non-exclusive list of
67. U.S. Model BiT, supra note 13, art. I, para. 1(b).
68. "Investment" is defined to mean:
every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as
equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes:
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights ... ;
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests
in the assets thereof;
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value, and
associated with an investment;
(iv) intellectual and industrial property rights ...; and
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pur-
suant to law ....
Id., art. I, para. l(b)(i)-(v); cf. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2198(a)
(1988) (" 'investment' includes any contribution or commitment of funds, commodities, ser-
vices, patent, process, or techniques, in the form of (1) loan or loans to an approved
project, (2) the purchase of a share of ownership in any such project, (3) participation in
royalties, earnings or profits of any such project, and (4) the furnishing of commodities or
services pursuant to a lease or other contract.").
69. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. I, para. 3 (the "alteration clause").
70. See id., art. II, para. 1 (establishing standards of treatment for "investments and
associated activities").
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examples similar to those in the United States Model BIT.7' Ad-
ditionally, like the United States Model BIT, the ASEAN treaties
protect "associated activities," using either a different but effec-
tively similar term" or through a less detailed definition of associ-
ated activities.'
However, the unqualified right to alter the form of the invest-
ment is problematic for two reasons. First, this unqualified right to
alter the form of the investment after admission and establishment
creates the risk of disrupting the policies served by admission
requirements imposed by the host state. All of the ASEAN
treaties that provide for a right to alter the form of the investment
include the requirement that the alteration not violate any restric-
tions. placed upon the investor or the investment as a term for
admission.' The United States Model BIT has no such provision
because it prohibits the use of admission requirements. Second,
when coupled with the definition of associated activities, the alter-
ations clause establishes a right to acquire ahd liquidate or dissolve
local companies, which is an unfavorable situation for LDCs.
Although [the United States Model BIT] provisions permit profit-
able foreign investment in enterprises capable of increasing em-
ployment and promoting development in the host State, these
provisions also equally allow the acquisition and liquidation of
productive local companies. Thus, protected investors might pur-
chase and liquidate local competitors to engage in anticompetitive
practices ... or they might simply acquire and liquidate under-
valued companies and expatriate the profits.
71. See, eg., Swed.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, art. 1(1). In fact, there is only one
treaty which does not include, a similar non-exclusive list defining the term "investment."
See Indon.-Nor. BIT, supra note 63 ("investment" left undefined).
72. See4 eg., U.C.-Indon. BIT, supra note 63, art. 4(2) ("[Each] Contracting Party
shall ... subject ... [protected investors] as regards their management, use, enjoyment
or disposal of their investments[,] to [MFN] treatment . . ").
73. See, e.g., F.R.G.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, art. 3 (protecting "activities in con-
nection with investments").
74. See UNCTNC, supra note 15, at 22. For a full discussion on admission require-
ments, see infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Swed.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, art. 1(1)(e)(ii); F.R.G.-Indon. BIT,
supra note 63, art. 1(1); F.R.G.-Phil. BIT, supra note 63, art. 8(1).
76. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. II; see infra notes 93-98 and accompanying
text (discussing problems caused by prohibiting use of admission requirements).
77. Sachs, supra note 45, at 207.
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The old definition of "associated activities" provided for the ex-
plicit right to acquire and liquidate or dissolve all corporations or
assets acquired by the investor.7 Although the new definition has
eliminated the explicit right to engage in such activities, an implicit
right to do so still exists. Protected associated activities still include
"the organization, control, operation, maintenance and disposition
of companies ... ; the acquisition, use, protection and disposition
of property of all kinds ... ; [and] the purchase and issuance of
equity shares."79 It can be argued that this new definition does
not permit the straightforward acquisition and subsequent dissolu-
tion of a local corporation;' regardless of this fact, the definition
appears to allow the liquidation of all or substantially all of an
acquired corporation's assets, such that the local corporation will
essentially become a shell. Because the new definition of associat-
ed activities is ambiguous and still appears to allow the acquisition
and dissolution of local companies, it should be qualified, perhaps
by a protocol to the BIT, so as to make clear that the BIT does
not create such a right."1
2. Types of Investors Protected. The United States Model
BIT protects the investment of the "nationals"'  and "compa-
nies ' of the contracting parties.' The definition of "company"
considers the jurisdiction where legal personality is created as
78. See 1983 U.S. Model BiT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 2.
79. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. I, para. 1(e) (emphasis added).
80. The definitional problems now turn on the interpretation of "disposition of." The
term "disposition" is defined under U.S. law as "transferring to the care or possession of
another." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 471 (6th ed. 1990). However, the definition of
"dispose of' is considered to include the exercise "in any manner, one's power of control
over [property]." Id. Considering the ambiguity in the terms used in the new definition
and the elimination of an explicit right to acquire and dissolve a local corporation, it can
be argued that such a right is not created under the new definition.
81. Of course, this recommendation assumes that the language was in fact altered to
eliminate the right to acquire and dissolve local companies. It is possible that the lan-
guage was changed not to eliminate the right, but instead, to disguise the right so that
other parties might overlook it; but this is merely speculation..
82. "'National' of a Party means a natural person who is a national of a Party un-
der its applicable law." U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. I, para. 1(c).
83. "'Company of a Party' means any kind of corporation, company, association, or
other organization, legally constituted under the laws and regulations of a Party or a
political subdivision thereof whether or not organized for pecuniary gain, or privately or
governmentally owned." Id., art. I, para. 1(a).
84. See id., art. I, para. 1(b).
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determinative of nationality.' However, either party (as host par-
ty) may deny protection to investments made by companies legally
organized under the laws of the other party that either are con-
trolled by nationals of a third country with which the host party
does not have "normal economic relations" or do not have "sub-
stantial business activities in the territory of the other party.""
Unfortunately, there is no further elaboration as to what "substan-
tial business activities" or "control" entail.' Additionally, there is
no indication as to which party's law should be used to determine
these questions. Therefore, to cure the ambiguity, an agreement
should be reached between the United States and its treaty part-
ners as to the definitions of "substantial business activities" and
"control." Such clarification should be made by means of a proto-
col or an exchange of letters. Other than these minor difficulties,
there does not appear to be any need to alter these provisions.
While the parallel provisions contained in the ASEAN treaties
contain a variety of tests for determining what investors are pro-
tected,' several contain a formulation similar to the U.S. stan-
dard.'
B. Treatment Standards
Article II of the United States Model BIT establishes Most
Favored Nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment, which-
85. The 1983 United States BIT used the "substantial control" test instead of the
jurisdiction where legal personality was created. 1983 United States BIT, supra note 13,
art. I, para. (b). The substantial control test inquires into the nationality of the control-
ling shareholders. Id.; see also Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (describing the "substan-
tial control" test and holding that it is not customary international law).
86. U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. I, para. 2.
87. For examples of possible U.S. provisions that might apply, see the ownership
requirement for OPIC insurance, 22 U.S.C. § 2198(c) (1988) (requiring 95% U.S. owner-
ship), and the requirement for protection under the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(1)(A) (1988) (requiring 50% U.S. ownership).
88. See, eg., U.K.-Phil. BIT, supra note 63, art. 1(4) (employing "place of effective
management" test); Neth.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, art. 1(2) (protecting Dutch compa-
nies either "lawfully constituted" in the Netherlands or "controlled directly or indirectly
by a national . . . or by a legal person constituted in accordance with the Netherlands
law").
89. See, e.g., F.R.G.-Phil. BIT, supra note 63, art. 8(4) (company deemed national of
state in which "seat" is located); F.R.G-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, art. 1(4), Protocol (1)
(protecting companies with their "seat" in Germany and companies "lawfully constituted"
in Malaysia, but not protecting subsidiaries incorporated in a third state).
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ever is better, for investment and its associated activities.' Run-
ning parallel to the national treatment standards is the provision in
the United States Model BIT that specifically prohibits either
party from imposing performance requirements (e.g., local inputs
quotas or export quotas) as a condition of establishment or opera-
tion of an investment.91 The United States Model BIT also pro-
vides that investments will be accorded "fair and equitable treat-
ment," and in any case, no less than that "required by interna-
tional law."'
Obtaining from all the ASEAN states MFN treatment, fair
and equitable treatment, and treatment no less favorable than that
"required by international law" should not pose any difficulty,
because these provisions are contained in virtually all the ASEAN
treaties.9 A major problem arises, however, with the standard of
national treatment and the prohibition of performance require-
ments as a term for entry. National treatment contains two differ-
ent concepts: "pre-admission" national treatment and "post-admis-
sion" national treatment. "Pre-admission" national treatment refers
to any requirements placed upon the incoming investment or in-
vestor as a prerequisite for admission into the host state. Some
examples of these types of regulations include restrictions or pro-
hibitions on investing in certain sectors of the economy, local
inputs requirements, export requirements, use of local labor, or
local ownership requirements. "Post-admission" national treatment
refers to any regulations, including taxation, licensing, and health
and safety laws, imposed on the investment (or its associated activ-
ities) after it has already been established. The treaties themselves
do not use the terminology "pre-admission" national treatment and
"post-admission" national treatment; in some instances they con-
fuse the two concepts. The United States Model BIT makes a
90. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 1. ("Each Party shall permit
and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than
that accorded in like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals
or companies [national treatment], or of nationals or companies of any third country
[MEN], whichever is the most favorable.
91. See hi, art. I, para. 5.
92. Id., art. II, para. 2.
93. All ASEAN states have accepted the provisions in one form or another in at
least one treaty (except, of course, Brunei, which has signed no treaties). See, e.g., Neth.-
Phil. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 3(2), 4(1); Nor.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 3(2), 4(1);
U.K.-Thai. BIT, supra note 63, art. 5(1); U.K.-Indon. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 3(2),
4(1)-(2); U.K.-Sing. BIT, supra note 63, art. 3.
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distinction between the two, and requires them both.' Several of
the ASEAN treaties grant national treatment in one form or an-
other, but none grant it in both forms unconditionally."' At this
time no ASEAN state, except perhaps Singapore, is willing to
grant national treatment in relation to "pre-admission" stan-
dards.' Disagreement over the national treatment standards was
directly responsible for cessation of treaty negotiations with Malay-
sia and was partially responsible for the failure to conclude a
treaty with SingaporeY Negotiations with Indonesia were never
begun, due to the understanding that Indonesia would not agree to
national treatment standards."8
A solution to the problem of national treatment is simple.
The United States should qualify its requirement of pre-admission
national treatment: It should focus instead on ensuring MFN treat-
ment for pre-admission treatment and national treatment for post-
admission treatment. If pre-admission restrictions are applied on
an MFN basis, U.S. companies are no worse off than their real
competition-other foreign investors. In fact, pre-admission re-
quirements can actually be helpful to U.S. interests, because they
94. The distinction can be seen in the use of the words "permit and treat" in Article
II: "Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, on a
basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated
activities of its own nationals or companies . U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art.
II, para. 1 (emphasis added).
95. Nearly all of the treaties exclude pre-admission national treatment, and the
treaties that include post-admission national treatment provide for exceptions. See U.K.-
Thai. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 3, 5 (providing for post-admission national treatment but
not pre-admission); U.K.-Sing. BIT, supra note 63, art. 3 (providing for pre-admission
national treatment and post-admission national treatment, but authorizing exceptions to
"particular matters" on an MEN basis); Neth.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 1(i), 6
(providing no pre-admission national treatment and post-admission national treatment for
industrial property rights); Indon.-Nor. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 11(a), III, Protocol (pro-
viding post-admission national treatment but not pre-admission national treatment but
Protocol allows Indonesia to derogate from post-admission national treatment standard);
F.R.G.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 1(ii), 2(2), 3 (providing no pre-admission national
treatment, MFN, and post-admission national treatment "[u]nless specific stipulations made
in the document of admission provide otherwise").
96. The State Department has stated that a "new" BIT may be signed with Singa-
pore which "will assure the United States that U.S. firms will be treated equally with
local firms when it comes to basic investment issues." See Senator Urges Bush to Seek
Solid Trade Action from Japan, supra note 60.
97. See MALAYSIA-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN, supra note 3 (After "three rounds
of bilateral investment treaty negotiations [with Malaysia] no agreement was reached on
the key U.S. request for national treatment ...."); Bergman, supra note 58, at 10 n.47
(among other things, Singapore was unwilling to protect unapproved investments).
98. See INDONESIA-COUNTRY MARKETING PLAN, supra note 3.
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provide a mechanism by which an LDC can regulate potentially
harmful effects on its economy and society." As a result, they can
be very useful in reducing the fear of many LDCs that large mul-
tinational corporations will exploit the local labor force and natu-
ral resources and then repatriate all the profits.
There are two possibilities for qualifying pre-admission na-
tional treatment. The first possibility is an expanded version of the
present United States Model BIT's Article II. The United States
Model BIT already provides for the "maintenance of limited ex-
ceptions" to national treatment.00 However, this provision must
be adjusted to allow more than "limited" exceptions if it is to be
satisfactory to Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. This change
would require a concerted effort to discern what areas of the
LDC's economy are most important to U.S. investors and which
areas are most important to the LDC (as host state)-with excep-
tions being limited to sectors specifically agreed upon, or with
national treatment being contained to sectors specifically agreed
upon.
The second possibility is replacement of the present provision
with a clause similar to that found in the Germany-Malaysia
BIT."1 Such a clause would establish pre-admission national
treatment as a general principle, but would allow the parties to
avoid the duty by making "specific stipulations in the document of
admission.""°  Potential U.S. investors would then negotiate for
99. See M. Sornarajah, The New International Economic Order, Investment Treaties
and Foreign Investment Laws in ASEAN, 27 MALAYA L. REV. 440, 454 (1985).
100. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 13, art. II, para. 1 (providing for exceptions to
both pre-admission national treatment and post-admission national treatment by "sector"
and to mining operations on public lands); see, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Oct. 27, 1982, U.S.-Pan., S. TREATY Doc.
No. 14, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (permitting Panama to "maintain limited exceptions"
in, inter alia, "communications; representation of foreign firms; distribution and sale of
imported products; retail trade; insurance; state companies; private utility companies; en-
ergy production; practice of liberal professions; customs house brokers; banking; [and]
rights to the exploitation of natural resources . . . ."); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Sept. 29, 1982, U.S.-Egypt, S. TREATY.
Doc. No. 24, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (modified by Supplementary Protocol, Mar. 11,
1986) (allowing Egypt to "maintain limited exceptions" in, inter alia, "[a]ir and sea trans-
portation; . . . mail, telecommunication, telegraph services and other public services which
are state monopolies; banking and insurance; ... ownership of real estate; [and] use of
land . . ").
101. F.R.G.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, arts. 2, 3.
102. Id.
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the conditions themselves. If the host state demands conditions
that are too onerous, investors will decide not to invest in that
state. The United States would still be able to maintain continuing
political pressure on the host state to eliminate progressively ad-
mission practices that violate the national treatment principle.
Theoretically, as the host state's economy develops, U.S. investors
would be subjected to less onerous requirements. However, the
choice would always be in the hands of the host state, providing it
with a sense of security. This option is more likely to succeed than
the first because it has already been accepted in Malaysia" and
Indonesia,1" and also because it is more flexible, leaving the
complex and arduous process of negotiating over each sector of
the economy to more appropriate parties-the host state and inter-
ested investors.
C. Currency Transfer
The United States Model BIT provides that "all transfers
related to an investment" shall be freely transferable "without
delay into and out of [the host state's] territory.""° Such transfers
must be allowed in a "freely convertible currency at the prevailing
market rate of exchange on the date of the transfer."" Similarly,
all of the ASEAN treaties include a provision allowing the free
transfer of capital and returns from capital."' The only difficulty
103. Id.
104. F.R.G.-Indon. BIT, supra note 63, art. 9.
105. U.S. Model BT, supra note 13, art. IV, para. 1. Transfers include:
(a) returns; (b) compensation pursuant to Article III; (c) payments arising out
of an investment dispute; (d) payments made under a contract, including amorti-
zation of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan
agreement; (e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an
investment; and (f) additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or
development of an investment.
Id.
106. Id., art. IV, para. 2. This requirement is in line with the requirements of Article
VIII of the International Monetary Fund. See Articles of Agreement of the International
Monetary Fund, art. VIII, para. 2(a) ("[N]o member shall ... impose restrictions on the
making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.").
107. See, e.g., U.K.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, art. 5 ("free transfer of . . . capital
and of the returns from it"; subject to "the right to restrict in exceptional circumstanc-
es . . . consistent with [the Party's] rights and obligations as a member of the [IMF]");
U.K.-Thai. BIT, supra note 63, art. 7 (similar to art. 5 of U.K.-Malay. BIT); F.R.G.-Phil.
BIT, supra note 63, art. 4 (guaranteeing the "transfer of the capital, of the returns from
it and, in the event of liquidation, of the net proceeds from such liquidation"); F.R.G.-
Indon. BIT, supra note 63, art. 4 (similar to art. 4 of F.R.G.-Phil. BIT).
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is that because the treaties only apply to "approved" investments,
any investments that are not approved are subject to local laws
restricting international transfers of capital. Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Thailand all have laws restricting the transfer of capital by
investors or investments which are not "approved.""l
D. Compensation for Expropriation
The most developed customary international legal principles
relating to international investment concern expropriation. Unfor-
tunately, the international legal principles are far from being set-
tled. This ambiguity has important ramifications because of the
United States' position that bilateral agreements affect customary
international law.1" The debate over the principles has emerged
as a developed-versus-developing world dispute. The developed
states support a pro-investor doctrine known as the "Hull Formu-
la," ' whereas many developing states support a more pro-state
sovereignty doctrine known as the "Calvo Doctrine..1 . The de-
veloped states argue that because over 200 bilateral agreements
contain it, the Hull Formula must be international law.1 The de-
veloping states, however, point out that more states reject the Hull
Formula than support it, and that over 150 bilateral agreements
and compensation agreements among states have resulted in com-
pensation involving less than the full value of the property tak-
en.
113
Not surprisingly, the United States Model BIT incorporates
the Hull Formula. Expropriation must be "for a public purpose; in
108. See INGRID D. DE LuPis, FINANCE AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 18 (2d ed. 1987). Singapore, in contrast, has removed all such re-
strictions. See SINGAPORE INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, at 5.
109. See supra text accompanying note 53-55.
110. The Hull Formula requires that in the event of nationalization compensation
must be "prompt, adequate, and effective." The doctrine was first enunciated by Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull in his letters to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs fol-
lowing the expropriation of many U.S.-owned farms and agrarian properties. See 19
DEP'T OF STATE: PRESS RELEASES 50-53, 140, 143-44 (1938).
111. The Calvo Doctrine provides that customary international law merely requires the
host state to afford foreigners essentially the same rights as it does nationals. See
HENKIN, supra note 17, at 1049. This doctrine is primarily supported by Latin American
States, but also was endorsed by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee in a
set of Principles Concerning Admission and Treatment of Aliens adopted in 1961. Id. at
1046.
112. See SHIHATA, supra note 7, at 238-39.
113. See id.
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a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation. '14 Furthermore, a clause has been
added to clarify the procedure for assessing the amount of just
compensation and to specify that the compensation itself is pro-
tected by the treaty.11 Additionally, the United States Model BIT
specifically addresses the situation in which an investment is not
taken outright by the state but is taken by more subtle means
("creeping expropriation"). 16
Although the ASEAN states voted in favor of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States,"7 which contains an affir-
mative acceptance of the Calvo Doctrine, the Hull Formula is
consistently supported within the ASEAN treaties.' Therefore,
even though the dispute over the customary international legal re-
quirements as to compensation for expropriation continues, the
ASEAN states have been consistently willing to sign treaties con-
taining the Hull Formula.
114. U.S. Model- BIT, supra note 13, art. III, para. 1.
115. This clause reads as follows:
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated
investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or became
known; include interest at a commercially reasonable rate from the date of
expropriation; be paid without delay; be fully realizable; and be freely transfer-
able at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.
Id.
116. "Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly
through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization . ... " Id. (emphasis
added). This language is in line with the position taken in comment g to section 712(1)
of The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law: "Subsection (1) applies not only to
avowed expropriations in which the government formally takes title to property, but also
[where government actions] have the effect of 'taking' the property, in whole or in large
part, outright or in stages." RESTATEMENT, supra note 16; see also First Hickenlooper
Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1)(C) (1988) ("actions, which have the effect of nation-
alizing, expropriating, or otherwise seizing ownership"). "Creeping expropriation" includes,
for example, restrictions on foreign residence and labor permits; discriminatory application
of tax, health, and safety laws; or dehabilitating price hikes or supply failures by state-
owned monopolies supplying vital supplies or services. See Richard C. Pugh, Legal Protec-
tion of International Transactions Against Non-Commercial Risks, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 301-06 (Walter S. Surrey & Crawford
Shaw eds., 1963); Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, [Draft Convention] Responsibility of
States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545, 553-55
(1961).
117. G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) (endorsing the Calvo Doctrine in Article 2(2)(c)).
118. See, e.g., Neth.-Phil. BIT, supra note 63, art. 5; U.K.-Thai. BIT, supra note 63,
art. 6; U.K.-Indon. BIT, supra note 63, art. 5, IV I.C.S.I.D. at 352.xi, 1:41-3.4 352.xv;
F.R.G.-Malay. BIT, supra note 63, art. 4(1), Protocol (5), (6).
[Vol. 42:679
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
IV. CONCLUSION
The current United States BIT Program is unsuitable for the
economic, political, and social conditions now existing in ASEAN.
Most of the ASEAN states, specifically Indonesia, Thailand, and
Malaysia, have achieved a level of economic development that
makes them very attractive for investment, but retain a level of
political and social development that introduces a degree of uncer-
tainty chilling to foreign direct investment. Although BITs cannot
promote investment in and of themselves, they can help to create
a favorable legal environment that reduces the level of real and
perceived risks caused by underdeveloped social and political insti-
tutions. The emphasis of the United States Model BIT should be
on risk reduction and on coordination of other mechanisms that
do the same. The BIT Program should focus on flexibility and
negotiation, not reaffirmation of U.S. opinion on customary inter-
national legal principles. Bilateral agreements are not the appropri-
ate means-in fact they are probably the worst possible means-by
which to pursue the goal of reaffirmation of U.S. opinion on cus-
tomary international legal principles. Bilateral agreements provide
the opportunity for both parties to negotiate and compromise on
contentious issues. The present U.S. position eliminates that very
strength. The United States should therefore reassess its present
BIT Program and adjust the Model BIT, as well as the Program's
fundamental purpose, so that it may take full advantage of the
inherent flexibility that could, and should, exist in the BIT. The
opportunity has already been missed in Singapore, and probably in
Brunei as well; hopefully, change will be made before it is too late
for the BIT to perform to its fullest potential in any ASEAN
state.
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